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Large infrastructure projects such as new roads, railways and nuclear plants have often suffered from public opposi-
tion, causing signiﬁcant delays and costs. In many cases poor engagement between the supporters of construction
and the public have contributed to this. Therefore, this paper proposes a novel design framework with the aim of
improving public engagement at an early design stage. Following a modiﬁed quality function deployment (QFD)
process, it enables incorporation of public preferences into the design process, thus helping to improve the social
acceptability of large infrastructure projects and reduce costs related to opposition and delays. The application of
the framework is illustrated by a case study related to design of nuclear power plants.© 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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designer and stakeholders, including the public, can help in. Introduction
ven the briefest review of the literature concerning large con-
truction and infrastructure projects will reveal an almost
ewildering array of papers and reports documenting pub-
ic opposition. These include hydroelectric projects in South
frica and China (Tilt et al., 2009), high-speed rail construc-
ion in Italy (Della Porta and Andretta, 2002), waste disposal
n Ireland (Ferreira and Gallagher, 2010) or new nuclear plants
n India (Gauba, 2013), to name just a few. Approaches, such
s focus group discussions, local liaison meetings and inter-
iews, can be used to engagewith the public in relation to such
rojects (see e.g. Powell and Colin, 2008). However, owing to
he often complex and technical nature of the design of large
nfrastructure, it is currently uncommon for the public’s view
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ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.psep.2013.12.005to be integrated into the design process. Indeed, a literature
search for the use of participatory design processes in large
construction and infrastructure projects yields no results to
our knowledge.
Participatory design developed in the late 20th century, par-
ticularly in the ﬁeld of information technology and computer
systems, as detailed in Kensing and Blomberg (1998). Research
has shown that the main beneﬁts of participatory design pro-
cesses lie not just in the fact that they lead to socially informed
designs but also that stakeholders (who could otherwise block
or delay the development) feel that their views and perspec-
tives are valued by the designer (Schuler and Namioka, 1993).
Providing a means for genuine two-way dialogue betweentive Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No DerivativeWorks
ction in any medium, provided the original author and source are
cepted10December 2013
developing mutual respect and trust. Ultimately, by building
er B.V. All rights reserved.
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(
Fig. 1 – Layout of a standard quality function deployment
(QFD) sheet.trust with the public a designer may be better positioned
to elicit design requirements that can be integrated into the
infrastructure in question, leading to designswhich alignwith
values, ideas and expectations of the public.
However, applying participatory design processes to com-
plex construction and infrastructure projects is not a trivial
task. One of the difﬁculties is engaging the public and eliciting
their views so that they can be used in the design process in a
meaningful way. A further important issue is that signiﬁcant
design changes can only be carried out cost-effectively at the
early conceptual design stages whichmeans that any effort to
include a public input into design must also take place at the
early stage. These and other issues are explored inmore detail
in the proposed participatory design framework, as described
in Section 2. This is followed by a case study in Section 3 with
the nuclear industry used as an example to illustrate how the
framework can be applied. The case study presents a hypo-
thetical conceptual design of a nuclear power plant generated
using the framework. This design is compared to the two
existing designs proposed for construction in the UK, West-
inghouse’s AP1000 (WEC, 2008) and Areva’s EPR (AREVA, 2005).
The relative strengths and weaknesses of the approach in the
proposed framework are discussed in Section 4 and conclu-
sions are drawn in Section 5. As far as the authors are aware,
this is the ﬁrst proposal for a participatory design framework
for large infrastructure projects.
2. Design framework
2.1. The participatory design framework
A participatory design framework which enables incorpora-
tion of stakeholder preferences, including those of the public,
must satisfy a number of criteria, as follows:
(i) allow different system design requirements to be consid-
ered by all relevant stakeholders;
(ii) cope with varied requirements, some of which would be
technical and quantitative and some of which could be
qualitative and ambiguous;
iii) provide simple traceability of the integration of the
requirements of different stakeholders, so that it could
be demonstrated to all stakeholders that their input was
considered seriously; and
(iv) allow for theweighting of different requirements to reﬂect
their technical (design) importance as well as their signif-
icance to different stakeholders.
There are many decision-support methods that can be
used in system design, including general morphological
analysis, multi-attribute decision analysis, decision (Pugh)
matrices and quality function deployment (QFD) (Blanchard
and Fabrycky, 1998; Dieter, 2000; Azapagic and Perdan, 2005).
Among these, QFD matches closely the above criteria and has
therefore been selected for use in this work. A full descrip-
tion of the standard QFD method is beyond the scope of this
paper but can be found, for example, in Chan and Wu (2002).
In short, QFD uses matrices and a weighting system to help
designers incorporate and prioritise client’s preferences into
product design. Fig. 1 shows a standard QFD layout which
has been adapted for the purposes of this work by modify-
ing the weighting system for design requirements, so that
they are weighted both on their technical importance and ontheir importance to different stakeholders. This is illustrated
in Fig. 2 and described inmore detail in the following sections.
2.2. Framework steps
As shown in Fig. 2, the main steps of the framework are:
1. determination of the requirements of all stakeholders,
including the public;
2. completion of the system-level QFD sheet including the
weighting of different requirements; and
3. interpretation of the output from the QFD to deﬁne the
system-level speciﬁcations of the design.
Each of these steps is discussed below, with reference
to Fig. 2 throughout. Note that the ‘designer’ referred to is
assumed tobe a teamof engineeringprofessionalswith appro-
priate skills and experience to carry out such a task. The
ﬁgures in the following section are based on the case study
presented in Section 3 and whilst they refer to the nuclear
industry to help illustrate the application, the steps described
are equally applicable to the design of any other large infras-
tructure system.
2.2.1. Step 1: Stakeholder requirements and public
preferences
The ﬁrst step (aswithmany design processes) is to understand
the requirements of the client. The proposed framework also
calls for a set (or sets) of additional stakeholder requirements,
such as the requirements of the public. In order to deter-
mine these additional stakeholder requirements, the client’s
requirements are combinedwith existing design knowledge to
create a series of possible design options which are then put
to the stakeholders to elicit their preferences. As mentioned
previously, this can be achieved in a number of ways such as
questionnaires, interviews, focus groups or liaison meetings.
The approach used and the scope of consultation with the
public will depend on many factors, including the available
time and the budget. The designer can then use the input pro-
vided by the stakeholders as a set of ‘external’ stakeholder
requirements, which can be integrated alongside the client’s
requirements in the QFD sheet.
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Fig. 2 – The proposed participatory design framework showing how the public’s preferences for different design options can
be included in the system-level design process (yellow boxes). The three key steps of the process (1–3) are also indicated.
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.2.2. Step 2: System level QFD – weighting the
equirements
nce all the requirements have been identiﬁed, they can be
ntered into theQFDsheet. A sectionof an exampleQFDsheet,
odiﬁed from the standard QFD format for the purposes of
his research, is shown in Fig. 3. The requirements are labelled
epending on the stakeholders involved as follows:
U – client requirement;
P – requirement by the public;
G – government requirement; and
C – combined requirement (all stakeholders sharing the
same requirement).
For ease of use, the requirements have also been separated
nto categories covering general aspects of design such as aes-
hetics and safety (see Fig. 3 for examples). Each requirement
s given two weightings (rather than one as in the standard
FD process) which are determined by the designer and the
lient based on stakeholder input:
stakeholder weight (S) deﬁnes the weight given to one
stakeholder’s requirements compared to another within
each aspect of design (e.g. aesthetics); and
aspectweight (A) deﬁnes theweight given to that particular
aspect compared to other aspects of design (e.g. aesthetics
vs safety).
In essence, the weightings act as a two-tiered system with
ach aspect weight (tier 1) being assigned a subset of stake-
older weights (tier 2).
The 0, 1, 3, 9 scale is used in keeping with standard QFD
ethods with 9 representing the highest weighting. Such a
ystem deliberately inﬂates the scoring of items deemed as
important’ (i.e. weighted 9). This makes seeing the impact of
ore important issues clearer to the designer. Any other scale
an be used if the designer has a particular preference (e.g. 0,, the reader is referred to the web version of the article.)
1, 2, 3). The scale chosen for stakeholder weight (S) should be
the same as that used for aspect weight (A) or comparisons
of how stakeholders affect the importance of design solutions
(described later in the paper) will be distorted. The values for
S and A are normalised over all requirements (P) in their
respective ‘relative weight’ columns (see Fig. 3) and then con-
verted into a relative percentage. Eqs. (1) and (2) show how
the relative stakeholder weight (Ws) and the relative aspect
weight (Ra) are generated:
Ws = SP∑
=1
S
× 100 (1)
Ra = AP∑
=1
A
× 100 (2)
It can be noted that Ra is independent of any stakeholder
input. This places the burden of responsibility for deﬁning
the importance of the aspects of design onto the technical
expert and in particular onto the designer. The weighting sys-
tem is set up this way because in all likelihood only technical
experts will have the specialist knowledge required to deﬁne
the importance of some design aspects, particularly safety in
comparison to some others, such as aesthetics. Ws and Ra
are combined later to provide an indication of the importance
of design solutions once the views of lay-stakeholders (the
public) are taken into account. However, it is important that
the stakeholder weighting reﬂects the signiﬁcance they place
on different aspects, otherwise the whole process is reduced
from participatory design to a simple act of stakeholder man-
agement. Therefore, the transparency and traceability which
are inherent in the framework (see requirement (iii) in Section
2.1), are key to demonstrating that stakeholders’ requirements
have been taken into account appropriately.
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Fig. 3 – An example of the QFD sheet. [Requirements are translated into design solutions (dark shaded boxes under the
category ‘Design Solutions’) and ‘sub-systems’ (light shaded boxes in the same category.) ‘Sub-systems’ in this context are
deﬁned loosely as areas which require further design development and deﬁnition, which occurs later in the framework. The
symbols in the relationship matrix on the right hand side deﬁne the strength of relationship between requirement and
design solution on a scale 0, 1, 3 and 9 with 1 denoting weak and 9 very strong relationship and 0 no weighting; triangle=1,
blank circle =3, circle with a dot in the middle=9. No symbol means no relationship exists. U= client requirement,
P = requirement by the public. ‘Direction of improvement’ row shows if the design solution has to be maximised, minimised
or met. The values for Relative Aspect Weight and Relative Stakeholder Weight have been rounded to the nearest integer in
this ﬁgure.]
A ‘zero’ weight is only given to those requirements thatwill
not be taken into account. Usually, this is used when making
comparisonsbetween includingandexcludinga certain stake-
holder’s views. Comparison can be achieved by duplication of
the QFD worksheet so that one sheet includes the views of all
stakeholders and the other sheet ignores the views of one of
the stakeholder groups. A direct comparison of the ‘before and
after’ to see the effect of ignoring a given stakeholder can then
bemade through analysis of the sheet output; this is described
in Section 2.2.4. In the example used in this paper, the public
and their views were ignored in the baseline sheet and then
incorporated in the comparison sheet to facilitate an under-
standing of the potential impact that the publicmight have on
the design.
Once all the requirements have been weighted, the
designer can then begin to determine design solutions for
each requirement. These are entered along the top (‘roof’)
of the QFD matrix. Some solutions will be complex and will
require further deﬁnition as sub-systems whilst others can be
deﬁned completely at this, system-level, design stage. Some
of the design solutions emerging at this stage will constrain
sub-system design and can be considered to be both design
solutions and emergent requirements that need to be incor-
porated in the deﬁnition of various sub-systems. Once the
design solutions row is fully populated in the QFD matrix, the
designer may wish to re-arrange them into logical groupings
(see Fig. 3 for an example).
2.2.3. Step 2: System level QFD – the correlation matrix
Following the weighting of the design requirements, the cor-
relation matrix is completed next. This deﬁnes the strengthof the relationship between the requirements and the design
solutions. This is an important stage, as some requirements
will affect design solutions in ways that may not have
previously been considered and these emergent relation-
ships can have a signiﬁcant effect on the resulting design
speciﬁcation. In keeping with conventional QFD methods,
symbols are used to denote the strength of the relation-
ships. In this work, relationship strength is assigned using
a 1, 3, 9 scale and is represented symbolically by triangles
(), blank circles (©) and circles with a dot (), respec-
tively (see Fig. 3). The designer is responsible for deﬁning the
strength of the relationship between requirements and solu-
tions, based on the stakeholder input. This can be achieved
using expertise and ‘know-how’ or by applying metrics to
the requirements and solutions and carrying out numerical
comparisons.
At the bottom of the QFD sheet the designer can also input
targets or limits for design solutions (as shown in Fig. 4 for an
example of aircraft impact protection and earthquake resis-
tance of infrastructure, here taken to be anuclear plant). These
can be driven by the designer themselves, or by external fac-
tors such as regulations, legislation or economic issues. Each
target or limit can be assigned a value related to the ‘level of
difﬁculty’ to help deﬁne the difﬁculty in achieving the overall
design. A scale from 1 to 3 can be used, where 1 represents
the lowest and 3 the greatest level of difﬁculty. It is important
to note that the majority of regulations will most likely affect
the sub-system and component levels of design rather than
the system level; however, this does not preclude some over-
all safety goals that may be interpreted and incorporated at
the system level.
Process Safety and Environmental Protection 9 2 ( 2 0 1 4 ) 687–701 691
n so
2
i
N
b
r
l
a
s
m
i
c
a
i
t
t
s
˛
t
i
I
w
i
˛Fig. 4 – Relative importance of desig
.2.4. Step 2: System level QFD – design solution
mportance
ext, the relative importance of the design solutions can
e calculated, as explained in more detail below, using the
elativeweighting of the requirements referenced to the corre-
ationmatrix. This is indicated at the bottom of the QFD sheet,
s shown in the lower half of Fig. 4. The higher the value of
olution’s importance, themore that design solution relates to
ultiple requirements and/or requirementswith highweight-
ng. This can be a powerful tool for assisting the designer and
lient in understandingwhich parts of the system-level design
re most important.
For a given design solution, absolute stakeholder solution
mportance (˛(W)n) is calculated as the sum of the product of
he relative stakeholder weight (Ws) and strength of the rela-
ionship value (Vns) related to the requirements in that design
olution (n):
(W)n =
S∑
s=1
(Ws · Vns) (3)
The absolute stakeholder solution importance (˛(W)n) is
hen normalised, resulting in the relative stakeholder solution
mportance (I(W)n). This is shown in Eq. (4):
(W)n =
˛(W)n
P∑
=1
˛(W)n
(4)
A similar process can be applied to the relative aspect
eighting (Ra), resulting in the absolute and relative solution
mportance (˛(R)n and I(R)n, respectively) as follows:
A∑
(R)n =
a=1
(Ra · Vna) (5)lution calculated in the QFD sheet.
I(R)n =
˛(R)n
P∑
=1
˛(R)n
(6)
This then allows the designer to compare the relative dif-
ference in importance assigned to design solutions before and
after a given stakeholder group’s view is taken into account
(i.e. that of the public). Fig. 5 shows the percentage difference
(D%) in relative solution importance (I(R)n) before and after
including the public’s views, as calculated using Eq. (7):
D% =
I(R)n(after) − I(R)n(before)
I(R)n(before)
× 100 (7)
For example, it can be seen in Fig. 5 that the calcu-
lated importance of ‘Internal layout allows ease of access
to maximise online maintenance’ is reduced by around 20%
after the inclusion of public views, whilst the importance
of both ‘Secure site’ and ‘Aesthetic design’ has increased by
around 17%. Note that the relative solution importance is nor-
malised and zero-sum so that any increases in the calculated
importance of some solutions must be counter-balanced by a
decrease in the calculated importance of other solutions.
The relative solution importance (I(R)n) will stay the same
regardless of the weightings assigned to stakeholders, as it is
independent of the relative stakeholder weighting (Ws). How-
ever, by applying the ratio between the relative stakeholder
solution importance before and after public views are taken
into account (I(W)n) (before) and I(W)n (after) to relative solu-
tion importance (I(R)n (before)), the change in the absolute
importance of design solutions as inﬂuenced by stakeholders
can be determined. This is achieved using Eq. (8):
( )
I(R)n(after) = I(R)n(before) ·
I(W)n(after)
I(W)n(before)
(8)
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Fig. 5 – An example graph showing the percentage difference in relative stakeholder solution importance before and after
including public views. Positive percentages equate to increased importance, negative percentages to decreased importance.Fig. 6 illustrates what happens when the relative differ-
ences in relative stakeholder solution importance (I(W)n) are
applied to the relative solution importance (I(R)n) in this way.
The white bars in Fig. 6 are the relative solution importance
(I(R)n) before the public view is taken into account and the
dark bars are calculated using Eq. (8) and represent the rel-
ative solution importance (I(R)n) after the public view is taken
into account. The shift between the bars shown in Fig. 6 relates
directly to the percentage shifts shown in Fig. 5. However, fur-
ther clarity of the overall importance of various solutions is
Fig. 6 – An example graph showing the relative solution importa
account the public views. The scale shows relative importance walso indicated by the size of the bars in Fig. 6. Looking at the
same examples we can see that whilst ‘Internal layout allows
ease of access to maximise online maintenance’ suffered a
20% drop in calculated importance, it is a relatively unim-
portant system-level characteristic. Similar could be said of
‘Aesthetic design’, which experiences a rise in importance but
overall it remains relatively unimportant. On the other hand,
the increase in calculated importance for ‘Site security’ pushes
it higher than other solutions, changing slightly the emphasis
that a designer might give at the ﬁnal system-level design.
nce before (white bar) and after (dark bar) taking into
ith higher values indicating greater importance.
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Fig. 7 – The top or ‘roof’ of the QFD sheet. [The matrix: interactions between design solutions are on a scale spanning -2 (),
-1 (−), 1 (+) and 2 (++); no entry in the matrix denotes no relationship. The row above the design solutions: requirement
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Therefore, the graphs in Figs. 5 and 6 allow the designer to
nderstand which parts of the system level design are inﬂu-
ncedmore (or less) by different stakeholder groups. However,
t should be noted that, as with any analysis and modelling
ctivity, thequality andusefulness of this ‘output’ information
s entirely dependent on the quality of the ‘input’ information
n the process.
.2.5. Step 2: System level QFD – design solution
nteractions
he ﬁnal stage of the QFD process is to complete the top
atrix, or ‘roof’ of the QFD sheet in order to deﬁne inter-
ctions between design solutions. This is shown in Fig. 7.
his stage remains unmodiﬁed from the approach taken in
tandard QFD processes. Interactions between design solu-
ions in the matrix are on a scale from −2 to +2; no entry in
he matrix denotes no relationship. A negative relationship
eans that the design solutions will interact in a detrimental
ay; positive relationshipsmean that the design solutions are
utually supporting and compatible. Often, these relation-
hips can be hard to determine at the system level because
olutions are not yet fully deﬁned. In such cases the designer
an use the relationships identiﬁed in the ‘roof’ to ‘ﬂag-up’
otential future conﬂicts so that they are not missed further
n in the design process. The row above the design solutions
n Fig. 7 shows if the target (provided at the bottom of the QFD
heet and described previously, see Fig. 4) needs to be met,
aximised or minimised.
It is important to recognise interactions between thedesign
olutions and sub-systems as they can strongly inﬂuence the
ange of design options available. This is particularly the case
or interacting sub-systems as it is important to ensure that
hey are mutually compatible. Some sub-systems are inter-
ependent and in such cases the design of sub-systems must
e prioritised to ensure that the safety and performance of the
verall system meet the related requirements. For example,
ig. 7 shows a high compatibility relationship between the
reactivity control system’ and the ‘instrumentation andcontrol (I&C) system’ for an example related to a nuclear
plant (denoted by ++ in the ﬁgure). Care taken at this stage
of the design process can save a great deal of time and effort
later if issues and conﬂicts are discovered and rectiﬁed early.
2.2.6. Step 3: Design solution selection
In order to provide speciﬁc and clear deﬁnitions for the func-
tionality of the sub-systems identiﬁed in the QFD sheet, a
number of additional decision-support tools can be applied.
Asmentioned previously, these include decision (Pugh)matri-
ces which are particularly useful in situations where existing
design solutions can be used to fulﬁl the requirements pro-
vided by stakeholders.
The output from this process is a set of system-level design
speciﬁcations which, when complete, can be re-evaluated
against the original requirements. Further design iterations,
including more public consultation if required, can then be
carried out and the framework process repeated until the sys-
tem design speciﬁcations fulﬁl the requirements. Once this
has been achieved, further ‘standard’ design can be applied,
resulting in a completed design ready for regulatory approval
and ultimately, construction.
The following section illustrates the application of the
design framework on a case study of nuclear plant design. The
case study is largely simpliﬁed for illustrative purposes. Simi-
larly, the views of the public are also an example based on the
work by the authors (Goodfellow, 2013) and do not necessar-
ily represent fully UK public’s views on the design of nuclear
plants.
3. Case study: design of a nuclear plant
informed by the public
3.1. Using the frameworkThe following sets of requirements were combined and con-
sidered within the design framework (see Table 1):
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Table 1 – System design requirements used for the case study (U – client requirements; P – public requirements; G –
governmental requirements).
Client (EUR) Public Governmental
Co-location U – No mirroring layout
U – No shared safety facilities
Design ethos U – Latest proven technology based on
light water reactor
P – Novel (modern)
approach
Safety system U – Defence in depth P – Blend of active
and passive systemsU – Passive preference
Physical plant
characteristics
U – Single turbine output
Site selection U – The plant should cope with site in
a wide range of locations/conditions
P – The plant should be
located away from people
G – The plant should
be on an existing site
Aircraft impact C – The plant should have visible
strong hard outer impact dome
C – The plant should have
visible strong hard outer
impact dome
Instrumentation and
control (I&C)
C – A modern digital I&C approach
should be taken
C – A modern digital I&C
approach should be taken
Weapons reprocessing C – A modern digital I&C approach
should be taken
C – A modern digital I&C
approach should be taken
Waste storage U – Minimum of 10 years storage
capacity available
P – Waste stored on site
pending ultimate disposal
Nuclear transport C – Movement minimised C – Movement minimised
Waste form U – Standardised
Containment U – Minimal release in extreme event
Social impact G – Brings jobs
Proliferation resistance G – Minimise
proliferation
Capital cost U – £1300 per kW G – Non-subsidised
Natural hazard
protection
U – Resistant to design basis accident
Grid connection U – Able to cope with loss of offsite
power
Power performance U – 600MW-1800MW P – Multiple small
reactors preferredU – Load following capable
Fuel efﬁciency U – 12–24 month cycle
Availability U – 90% or greater
Design life U – 40 (60) year lifetime
• the European Utility Requirements (EUR) (EUR, 2011) which
are a consolidated set of requirements generated by a con-
sortium of European energy utility companies;
• a set of requirements by the public obtained through a sur-
vey carried out by the authors and presented in Goodfellow
(2013); and
• a set of governmental requirements born fromWhite Papers
(BERR, 2008; DECC, 2012) and overarching international pol-
icy on nuclear material proliferation (IAEA, 2011).
For the aspects weighting (A) required for the input to
the QFD in Step 2 of the framework (see Section 2.2.2 and
Fig. 2), the EUR terminology of ‘shall, should, may’ was used
to deﬁne the weights of 9, 3, and 1, respectively. ‘Shall’ refers
to requirements that are non-negotiable, ‘should’ to require-
ments where equivalent alternatives may be considered and
‘may’ to requirements that are desirable but not essential
(EUR, 2011). Two QFD sheets were then completed, one where
the energy utility and government were given a stakeholder
weighting (S) of 3 and the public was given a stakeholder
weighting of 0 (i.e. the public viewwas not taken into account)
and a second where all stakeholders were given a stakeholder
weighting of 3 (i.e. all stakeholders were treated equally). The
‘middle’ value on the 1, 3, 9 scale was chosen to allow future
ﬂexibility in comparing stakeholders by giving them stronger
and weaker weightings (not presented in this paper). Comple-
tion of the QFD correlation matrix (Section 2.2.3 and Fig. 2)
resulted in a set of design solutions as shown in Table 2. Forthis case study, the correlation matrix was completed by the
authors; in practice it is likely that a larger team of profes-
sional engineers would complete the matrices to ensure that
a pluralism of views and expertise are taken into account.
The highlighted rows in Table 2 indicate design solutions that
need no further deﬁnition at the system level. These are also
emergent requirements, meaning that they will impact on the
deﬁnition of sub-systemswhere further deﬁnition is required.
Nuclear energy is subject to signiﬁcant technological lock-
in (Cowan, 1990; Stamford and Azapagic, 2011). This means
that many of the requirements stated in the EUR document
are prescriptive about the solutions that can be chosen within
the design of a plant (EUR, 2011). Examples of this are:
• EUR 2.2, 1 Type and Plant Size, which states ‘The plant shall
be a Light Water Reactor (LWR) nuclear power plant, either
with a Pressurised Water Reactor (PWR) or a Boiling Water
Reactor (BWR) Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS)’; and
• EUR 2.2, 3.1 Type of Fuel, which states ‘The core design will
be optimised for UO2 fuel assemblies.’
These requirements signiﬁcantly constrain the design
space within which the designer can operate. They may also
rule out design solutions for which other stakeholders would
have a preference, such as thorium-fuelled reactors or some
of the more novel Generation IV nuclear plant designs which
are not LWRs (Generation IV International Forum, 2008).
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Table 2 – Design solutions after the requirements from
Table 1 have been processed in the QFD sheet.
Solutions Level of deﬁnition
achieved
Reactor performance-related
Reactor type Further deﬁnition
required
Reactor size Further deﬁnition
required
Reactivity control system Further deﬁnition
required
Standard enriched fuel System level
deﬁnition complete
MOX loading capability System level
deﬁnition complete
Plant performance-related solutions
Digital I&Ca system Further deﬁnition
required
On site used fuel storage ponds System level
deﬁnition complete
Minimise usage and production of
proliferable material
System level
deﬁnition complete
Modular design System level
deﬁnition complete
Utilise economy of scale (ﬂeet build) System level
deﬁnition complete
Internal layout allows ease of access
to maximise online maintenance
System level
deﬁnition complete
Equipment health management
system
Further deﬁnition
required
Long-life components System level
deﬁnition complete
Ultimate heat sink Further deﬁnition
required
Reactor safety-related solutions
Independent safety systems in
non-mirrored layout
System level
deﬁnition complete
Passive safety integrated into design Further deﬁnition
required
Active systems available and safety
rated
Further deﬁnition
required
Backup power systems Further deﬁnition
required
Fuel in standard assemblies that last
into used storage
System level
deﬁnition complete
Strong containment structure around
reactor core
System level
deﬁnition complete
Structural safety-related solutions
Hard outer impact dome over primary
containment
System level
deﬁnition complete
Secure site Further deﬁnition
required
Adequate defence against ﬂood Further deﬁnition
required
Concrete base-mat System level
deﬁnition complete
Robust grid connection Further deﬁnition
required
Location-related solutions
Site location Further deﬁnition
required
Connecting infrastructure Further deﬁnition
required
Skill availability Further deﬁnition
required
Aesthetic design Further deﬁnition
required
a Instrumentation and control.For sub-systems and areas where further deﬁnition is
required, a number of existing design techniques can be used
(as outlined in Section 2.2.6 and Step 3 in Fig. 2). As nuclear
energy is a mature technology, it is often possible to choose
from a range of existing design solutions. Asmentioned in the
previous section, decision (Pugh) matrices can be used to help
the designer to assess different options against each other by
using the requirements for the system in question. An exam-
ple of the Pugh matrices used in this case study is shown in
Table 3. Weighting corresponds to the strength of relationship
between the requirement and the design solution in question,
in this case ‘Ultimate heat sink’. Any emergent requirements
and related sub-systems that act as requirements would be
added at the bottom of the list and the respective ‘relative
solution importance’ used to determine weighting value. In
order to achieve this, the designer must look at the whole
range of values for ‘relative solution importance’ and deter-
mine an appropriate weighting scheme for use in the Pugh
matrix. In this case study, ‘relative solution importance’ val-
ues ranged from around 0.5 to 8 and it was trivial to transpose
these values onto a 0, 1, 3, 9 scale by rounding off to the nearest
value.
The ﬁnal total score (T) at the bottomof Table 3 is calculated
by multiplying the weighting and score for each requirement,
summed over all design requirements () for each design solu-
tion:
T =
P∑
=1
(weighting · score) (9)
The score assigned to each design solution against each
requirement can be subjective, based on the view of the
designer, or objectively assessed against benchmarked data;
the higher the score, the better the design option fulﬁls the
requirements. For example, the third requirement in the list
‘Defence in depth’ in Table 3 could be judged on a risk
informed basis by using data showing power failure rates and
ﬂood/drought hazard probabilities. In this case a combination
of benchmarks and variations has been noted in the table.
Once this process is completed for each of the sub-systems
requiring further deﬁnition (fromTable 2), a set of system level
requirements is obtained as shown in Table 4. Care must be
taken to ensure that the design solutions selected for each
sub-system are mutually compatible (the ‘roof’ matrix in the
QFD assists with this, see Section 2.2.5 and Fig. 2).
Standard design processes are then applied to further
deﬁne the reactor. In reality, very few people would ever be
required to design a nuclear plant from scratch, as most reac-
tor vendors have considerable experience and a number of
previous designs to build from. However, Lamarsh and Baratta
(2001) provide an indication of the process to follow if one was
to design a reactor from scratch. In any case, the framework
proposed in the current work is compatible with approaches
that start from a blank page as well as with those that use
extensive previous design work to reﬁne designs; as shown in
Fig. 2, the ‘Existing Design Knowledge’ input box allows for
this to take place.
The example conceptual design of a nuclear reactor and
the rest of the plant presented below was created using the
proposed design framework, beginning with a blank page, and
then applying the type of design approach laid out by Lamarsh
and Baratta (2001), starting with deﬁning the power required,
determining the amount of nuclear material in the reactor
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Table 3 – Example of a Pugh matrix used to evaluate different options for ultimate heat sink (UHS).
Requirement
and
benchmark
Weighting Natural draught
cooling towers score
Fan assisted cooling
towers score
The sea score A river score
U – A reliable
UHS must be
available
Θ 9 4 3 5 3
(Reliability)
P – The UHS
should be low
visibility and
managed
Θ 9 1 3 4 4
(Visibility)
U – Defence in
depth
Ο 3 4 3 4 2
Possible power failure Water availability
(drought/ﬂood)
P – Blend of
active and
passive
systems
Ο 3 4 4 4 4
P – The plant
should be
located away
from people
Ο 3 4 4 4 2
Proximity to
settlements and
size of river
G – The plant
should be on
an existing site
Θ 9 2 2 4 1
UK standard
U – Resistant to
design basis
accident
Θ 9 4 3 4 2
Possible power failure Water availability
(drought/ﬂood)
U – able to cope
with loop
Θ 9 4 2 4 4
Possible power failure
150Total score 171
core and then working outwards through the primary and
secondary systems using thermodynamic calculations.
As mentioned previously, this is used purely as an exam-
ple to illustrate how the framework can produce technically
feasible design solutions rather than representing a deﬁni-
tive or preferred nuclear plant solution. For that, signiﬁcantly
more data would need to be gathered using wider stakeholder
engagement before a true reﬂection of public preferences
could be integrated into a real nuclear plant design.
3.2. An example conceptual design of a nuclear plant
The conceptual design shown is for a 735 MWth PWR with
two primary side heat extraction loops. These connect to a
secondary loop, which utilises a Rankine cycle (Zemansky
and Dittman, 1997) with pre-heating via one high-pressure
and two low-pressure steam turbines to produce approxi-
mately 240MWe. Multiple units could be co-located on a site
to increase power output; for example four (or six) such units
could be used to provide 960MWe (or 1440MWe) of power to
the electrical grid. A tertiary loop provides the plant with an
ultimate heat sink, with ﬂow requirements and heat output225 150
relatively comparable to those of proposed new nuclear plants
(such as EPR (AREVA, 2005) and AP1000 (WEC, 2003)).
Whilst the type of reactor was largely dictated by the EUR
(2011)which prescribe a LWR, the following key characteristics
of the proposed plant design are a direct consequence of the
application of the participatory design framework based on
the previously mentioned public survey (Goodfellow, 2013):
• the smaller size of the proposed plant corresponds to
expressed public preferences for reactor designs that ‘ﬁt-in’
more closely with their environment;
• a ‘belt and braces’ approach to safety is taken, driven by
preferences expressed by the public for the use of both
active and passive safety systems.
However, sometimes ﬁnding mutually acceptable design
solutions can be challenging. For example, the public survey
found that the majority (71%) of the UK public felt that multi-
ple small reactors on one site would be no less safe than one
large reactor with 32% saying it would make them feel safer
(Goodfellow, 2013). This requirement was in contrast to the
EUR which state that a plant should be of size 600–1800MWe.
However, the EUR do not say that such a plant would consist of
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Table 4 – Example system speciﬁcations derived from following the proposed framework.
Reactor performance-related solutions
Reactor type Dispersed pressurised water reactor (PWR)
Reactor size ∼200MWe
Reactivity control system Integrated control rod system with chemical shim
Standard enriched fuel Standard enriched fuel
MOX loading capability MOX loading capable
Plant performance-related solutions
Digital I&C system Digital I&C system
On site used fuel storage ponds Capacity for 60 years’ worth of used fuel
Minimise usage and production of proliferable
material
Use standard fuel assemblies and provide secure on site storage
Modular design Optimised for ﬂeet build
Utilise economy of scale (ﬂeet build) Optimised for ﬂeet build
Internal layout allows ease of access to maximise
online maintenance
Particular attention to steam-generator replacement
Equipment health management system Monitoring system to assist preventative maintenance
Long-life components For 60 year design life
Ultimate heat sink The sea, or if site inland or sea insufﬁcient, then use forced-draught towers
Reactor safety-related solutions
Independent safety systems in non-mirrored layout Particular concern for rotatives and impact structures
Passive safety integrated into design Gravity fed feed water system, accumulators for loss of coolant accident
(LOCA) sequence
Active systems available and safety rated backup
power systems
Active containment residual heat removal system
Gas-turbine generators mounted high
Fuel in standard assemblies that last into used
storage
17×17 standard PWR assemblies
Strong containment structure around reactor core Concrete with steel liner
Structural safety-related solutions
Hard outer impact dome over primary containment Concrete dome on top of containment
Secure site Deﬁned site boundary, fenced with security patrols and CCTV
Adequate defence against ﬂood Site raised to adequate level above sea level (site dependent)
Concrete base-mat Speciﬁed to provide solid foundation and design basis earthquake resilience
Robust grid connection Multiple grid connections, physically separated to minimise loss of offsite
power (LOOP) potential
Location-related solutions
Site location Corresponding to local regulations on proximity to population centres,
existing sites preferred
Connecting infrastructure Direct rail connection for material transport. Unobtrusive road links for
personnel and non-nuclear supplies
Skill availability Local skill base in place (existing site), training facilities provided
Aesthetic design Visible but ﬁts into locale with minimum disruption to natural environment
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wnly one reactor. Small reactor concepts have developed sig-
iﬁcantly since the EUR were last issued in 2007 and there is
cope for multiple reactors to make up the desired capacity.
This is an example of how one area arising from the
ublic consultation (a desire for smaller nuclear plants) can
ave a marked effect on the overall plant design; however,
ore research on understanding the public’s perspective is
equired to ensure that this design decision is truly repre-
entative of public views. Care must be taken to ensure that
hen one such issue (plant size) does have such a dominant
ffect on the design that all options are explored and that,
deally, additional consultations/research are carried out to
nsure the issues are understood as completely as possible.
he following section describes the reactor design in more
etail.
Fig. 8 shows a side-proﬁle schematic of the nuclear com-
onents of the proposed plant and a top down view of the
ame system is shown in Fig. 9. In both ﬁgures, the fuel stor-
ge pond is shown on the right and in-containment refuelling
ater storage tank (IRWST+) is on the left. The IRWST+ pro-
ides water during refuelling but also acts as the residual
eat removal system and as an emergency low pressure feed
ater system and steam condenser. In the top-down view, themain steam-lines are shown protruding through the side-wall
of the containment structure at the bottom of the diagram.
Reactor pressure vessel shielding is shown around the reactor
pressure vessel in the centre. IRWST+ feed-lines and residual
heat removal heat-exchanger are not shown in the top-down
view.
The primary loop is housed within a reinforced concrete
containment structure which has an integrated steel liner
which is intended to prevent any release of radiation should
a primary loop leak incident occur. A concrete shield dome,
intended to prevent damage to the reactor from external
impacts, also tops this containment structure. The reactor
uses ‘standardised’ 17×17 PWR fuel assemblies, which are
currently commercially available. On-site storage capacity for
used fuel assemblies is provided tomeet the 60 year design life
of the plant. Space is provided for removal and replacement
of the steam generators and pressuriser after 30–40 years.
Site footprint, shown in Fig. 10, is approximately one quar-
ter of that required by the AP1000 (WEC, 2003). This smaller
size, combined with the lower height of the plant results in
a lower visual impact. This corresponds to expressed public
preferences for plants that are smaller and able to blend in
better with the natural environment.
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Fig. 8 – Side-proﬁle schematic of the nuclear components of
the proposed plant. In-containment refuelling water
storage tank and residual heat removal system (IRWST+)
are shown; for shielding tank see Fig. 9. [a – polar crane; b –
pressuriser; c – steam-generator; d – accumulator; e –
reactor coolant pump; f – reactor core (fuel assemblies); g –
Fig. 10 – Top down site plan showing the layout of the
constituent buildings for a single unit of the proposedreactor pressure vessel; h – shielding tank]
The plant relies on a combination of active and passive
safety systems which are designed to work in the event
of any critical plant failure. The cases of a loss-of-coolant-
accident (LOCA) and loss-of-offsite-power (LOOP) have been
considered and managed appropriately with the provision of
Fig. 9 – Top-down view of the systems shown in Fig. 8.
In-containment refuelling water storage tank and residual
heat removal system (IRWST+) are shown. Polar crane not
shown for clarity. For key, see Fig. 8.design.
multiple redundant safety systems. In the case of a LOCAhigh-
pressure, accumulators are used in the short term to make
up primary circuit water volume until primary circuit pres-
sure reaches ambient. At this point a residual heat removal
and in-containment steam recycling system takes over, pro-
viding low pressure injection of liquid water until the plant
reaches a cold shutdown state. Two 5MWegas-turbine genera-
tor sets are used to provide independent power to this residual
heat removal system (along with instrumentation and control
systems), allowing time for a controlled ‘scram’ to turn the
plant off (technically known as cold shutdown state). These
features are designed to provide a ‘belt-and-braces’ approach
to safety with both active and passive safety systems used
in combination with each other. Again, as stated previously,
this corresponds to the preferences expressed by the public in
work previously carried out by the authors (Goodfellow, 2013).
Table 5 provides a summary comparison of selected key
system-level features of the proposed plant with the AP1000
and EPR. As can be seen, the proposed plant is much smaller
than theAP1000 and EPR designs that have passed through the
UK’s Generic Design Approval (GDA) process: 239MWe com-
pared to 1115MWeand1600MWe, respectively.Muchhas been
written recently about small reactors (Ingersoll, 2009) and in
particular their economics. The general trend innuclear power
has been for larger single unit plants to maximise the econ-
omy of scale; for this reason, smaller reactors are generally
perceived to bemore expensive than larger reactors. However,
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Table 5 – Selected design speciﬁcations for EPR, AP1000 and the proposed plant example.
Reactor EPR AP1000 Plant proposed in this study
Thermal power 4500MWth 3415MWth 735MWth
Electrical power 1600MWe 1115MWe 239MWe
Efﬁciency 35% 33% 32.5%
Number of coolant loops 4 2 2
Coolant ﬂow rate (per loop) 7.9m3/s 9.94m3/s 1.85m3/s
RPV inlet temp 296 ◦C 281 ◦C 290 ◦C
RPV outlet temp 327 ◦C 321 ◦C 320 ◦C
Steam ﬂow rate 2554kg/s 1886kg/s 418kg/s
Steam temperature 290 ◦C 273 ◦C 290 ◦C
Steam pressure 7.6MPa 5.8MPa 7.5MPa
Steam-generator (SG) heat
transfer surface
7960m2 11,477m2 2250m2
Number of heat exchanger
tubes
5980 10,025 3200
SG outer diameter 5.2m 5.6m 2.1m
SG height 23m 22.5m 8.5m
Active core height 4.2m 4.2m 4.2m
Equivalent core diameter 3.8m 3m 1.8m
No. of fuel assemblies 241 157 57
RPV inner diameter 4.9m 4m 2.5m
RPV total height 12.7m 12m 10.5m
Pressuriser volume 75 m3 60 m3 25 m3
Pressuriser inner diameter 2.6m 2.3m 2m
Reactor coolant pump number 4 4 2
Flow rate 7.7m3/s 5m3/s 2.2m3/s
Pump head 100m 111m 100m
Safety systems 4 independent active systems:
• Medium head safety injection
system
• Low head safety injection
system
• Residual heat removal system
• Passive accumulators
• Containment heat removal
system
• Core melt catcher
• External impact protection
Passive safety systems:
• Passive accumulators
• Passive core cooling system
(via IRWST)
• Passive containment cooling
system
• In vessel retention of melt
• External impact protection
Mix of active and passive systems:
• Passive accumulators
• Passive core cooling system
(via IRWST)
• Active containment heat
removal system
• Core melt catcher
Backup power 8×8MW diesel for safety
systems
4×3MW diesel in case of
extended station blackout
None required – 2×4MW
diesel in case of extended
station blackout
2×5MW gas turbines for
safety systems and station
blackout
Time before operator
intervention required
following design basis
accident
Not speciﬁed 72h >150h
Containment vessel vertical
dimension
(depth of containment vessel
base)
67m
(−10m below ground)
65.5m
(−18.5m below ground)
41m
(−15m below ground)
Containment diameter 46m 40m 28m
EPR and AP1000 data are from AREVA (2005) and WEC (2003).
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eesearch suggests that other factors, such as a lower invest-
ent risk proﬁle, increased learning from constructing more
eactors and improved safety due to lower levels of residual
eat,mean that smaller reactorsmaybe competitive in certain
arket situations (Carelli et al., 2010).
The components required for the proposed plant are also
uch smaller than those required forAP1000 andEPR (Table 5).
his has the potential to increase the number of locations able
o manufacture nuclear components. In turn, this increases
ompetition and has the potential to drive down costs. Fur-
hermore, the size of the components on the proposed plant
s much more in keeping with the size of pressure ves-
els used over the last 100 years meaning that additional
xperience exists in manufacturing, maintenance and defectcorrection. The downside of this reduced component size
is that some components do not scale down very well. For
example, although the output of the proposed plant is one
ﬁfth of that of the AP1000, the containment building is still
large, roughly two thirds the height and diameter, reducing
the potential for cost saving of the plant. This is the same for
a number of other high cost parts of the plant, such as the
instrumentation and control system.
Regarding costs, using the ‘shall, should, may’ terminology
of the EURs leads to cost being given the same weighting as
many other requirements. This is clearly not a true reﬂection
of the economic reality of designing a nuclear plant which, in
most cases, is a purely commercial endeavour. Although this
is a limitation of the case study considered here, the proposed
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being given to cost if appropriatelyhigherweights are assigned
to cost-related requirements.
4. Discussion
As mentioned previously, the cost of implementing the pro-
posed participatory design framework must be assessed
against the potential beneﬁts. These cost changes are hard
to deﬁne as they may rely on the probability that the project
will face opposition during or after construction. Such oppo-
sition is heavily dependent on a wide range of cultural, social,
political and economic factors and understanding how and if
opposition will take place requires further research. Signiﬁ-
cant further research is also required to help understand how
the efﬁcacy of such a framework could be evaluated and com-
pared to existing methods of stakeholder engagement or an
absence of any engagement.
From a practical perspective, using the framework does
require additional effort on capturing public requirements on
the part of the designer. Design organisations may not have
expertise in public engagement and the nuances of ‘softer’
social research. Many options exist for outsourcing suchwork,
allowing a designer to follow the proposed framework with-
out requiring a signiﬁcant expansion of skills and expertise
in social science and public engagement. There will be a cost
for this additional work, both in terms of ﬁnance but also in
the time taken to execute the engagement processes, elicit
public preferences and analyse the resulting data. However,
public engagement could potentially save the time and costs
that could be caused by opposition to the project.
The time taken to bring a design to market also presents
issues. Often the time taken between design work being car-
ried out and an infrastructure project being completed can
be measured in decades. In the intervening period the pub-
lic may become disenfranchised unless engagement activities
continue and the public are kept informed about the progress
being made. Additionally, public views on what is and is not
acceptablemay change over time depending on other external
factors. For example, it is logical to assume that future acci-
dents in the nuclear industry would potentially have a large
bearing onpublic views on anuclear plant design, though such
effects could be temporary (Siegrist andVisschers, 2013). Other
more subtle factors may also become signiﬁcant over longer
periods of time. More research is required to understand these
longitudinal factors and the impact which theymight have on
processes such as those proposed in this work.
An advantage of the proposed framework is that the use of
tools such as QFD and Pugh matrices allows the inﬂuence of a
requirement to be traced through the design process. This can
assist in demonstrating to the public that their input is hav-
ing a demonstrable effect on the design. In turn, this assists in
assuring the public that their views are being taken seriously.
Even if the resulting design is not exactly as any individual
would prefer, it can be shown that their view has been used
in the process of arriving at that design. An improvement in
the level of engagement between the designer and the pub-
lic may also assist in the relationship between the client and
the public, particularly if the client continues the process of
engagement once a project is completed.
Although the process of using the QFD matrices and
additional design support tools is relatively straightforward
in principle, carrying out this work using a full set ofrequirements for any large infrastructure project canmake the
process increasingly complex. This would also be the case if
(and when) a wider range of techniques is used to understand
public design preferences. There is a risk of ‘data overload’ and
it is imperative that the designer carefully manages the num-
ber of requirements used at the ‘top’ system level. This is a
common issue with many system design processes and it can
bemanaged successfully, but this does require the designer to
use time and experience effectively.
It should also be borne in mind that the proposed frame-
work is a system design tool. Like any tool, the results that it
produces are only as good as the information fed into it in the
ﬁrst place. Improper use, unusual circumstances, poor data
and inadequate interpretation of requirements can all cause
the resulting system design to be ﬂawed. Experience in elic-
iting requirements, particularly in gaining an understanding
of the public’s design preferences and experience in using the
framework can help to minimise these issues.
Further research is required to improve understanding
of public’s preferences with respect to large infrastructure
projects, and perhaps more importantly, the underlying rea-
sons behind these preferences. Additional research may be
needed to understand how the output of different types of
research into public preferences could be amalgamated and
processed into a set of public requirements. For example:
• understandinghowmuchwork is required in combining the
output of questionnaires, interviews and focus groups;
• understanding the views of different local and national
groups of people and how best to engage them; and
• understanding the importance, accuracy and relevance of
the data provided by each research method and group.
In this paper, the framework was demonstrated by a con-
ceptual design of a new nuclear reactor. In reality, it is perhaps
more likely that a designer would take an existing design and
seek to make incremental improvements. In principle, there
is no reason why this framework could not be used in that
way too. The opportunity exists during public consultation to
put forward examples of incremental improvements, using
an existing design as a baseline, in an effort to elicit public
preferences.
5. Conclusions
This paper has described a novel framework for the design of
large infrastructure projects that allows a designer to incorpo-
rate a wider range of stakeholder views, including the views
of the general public. It has also demonstrated that, whilst
the integration of public’s preferences may lead to different
designs, it does not necessarily lead to a design that is unfea-
sible but provides a compromise solution that is intended to
fulﬁl as many of the different requirements as possible. As a
result, large infrastructure projects could be designed in a way
that is more socially acceptable and sustainable.
The possible beneﬁts of using a participatory design frame-
work such as this one are twofold. Firstly, the design of the
infrastructure in question can be improved as compared to
the wider set of design requirements laid out by the addi-
tional stakeholders whose views are now considered (i.e. the
lay public). Secondly, by involving a wider range of stake-
holders, including the lay public, designers gain an important
new source of information which can be used to engage in a
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Bwo-way communication. Ultimately, if carried out success-
ully, the public would gain trust in the design process and
ngineers along with valuable insight into the considerations
ade during design. At the same, the designer would gain the
upport of the public and a degree of social acceptance beyond
hat which many large infrastructure projects (for example,
ew nuclear plants) have experienced so far.
omenclature
(R)n absolute solution importance
(W)n absolute stakeholder solution importance
design requirement ( =1, 2, . . ., P)
design aspect (a=1, 2, . . ., A)
 aspect weight
% percentage difference in relative solution impor-
tance I(R)n before and after including public’s views
(R)n relative solution importance for design solution n
(W)n relative stakeholder solution importance for design
solution n
design solution (n=1, 2, . . ., N)
a relative aspect weight
stakeholder (s=1, 2, . . ., S)
 stakeholder weight for design requirement 
total score
ns strength of the relationship for stakeholder s related
to stakeholder requirements in design solution n
s relative stakeholder weight for design requirement 
and stakeholders
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